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Abstract 
In this paper, coordination problem of agricultural products supply chain with stochastic yield is studied based on prices 
compensation strategy. The agricultural producing is influenced by the natural conditions, and the yield is uncertain. 
While agricultural products is rigid demand goods, the fluctuations of yield cause greater volatility of prices. The two-
echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailor is studied, and the mathematical model is constructed. The model 
showed that prices compensation strategy is  Pareto improvement for agricultural products supply chain with stochastic 
yield, and it also incentive agricultural products supplier to rise the production plan and balance the profit allocation of 
supply chain. 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural products are the necessities of human life and rigid consumer goods, and it is one of the most 
important social producing. Since the human society entered the modern time, agricultural production has 
become an industry with more detailed labor division, and most consumers do not need to produce agricultur-
al products, which make production supply and consumption of agricultural products a supply chain. With the 
developing of supply chain management theory, many companies like IBM, P&G, DELL succeeded in apply-
ing supply chain management into bassness, and the agricultural product industry also have applied the   
supply chain management theory to improve their own competitiveness. In developed countries, Agricul-
tural product supply chain has been widely practice, and become a hot topic in academic research. 
Kazaz, 2004 consider the random yield characteristics in the process of agricultural production, production 
planning and pricing decision problem under the background of random output. Deo, 2009 focuses on  the 
influenza vaccine market of United States, studies the problem of stochastic output with  Cournot competition 
model, and found that random yield incentive the industry tend to become gathering, and reduce the produc-
tion plan, which damage consumer welfare. 
Bohle Maturana and Vera, 2010 focus on wine grape harvesting scheduling optimization problem subject 
to  yield uncertainty. The research shows how effective robust optimization is solving this problem in practice 
and develop alternative robust models and show results for some test problems obtained from actual wine 
industry problems. Boyabatli, Kleindorfer and Koontz, 2011 analyzes the optimal procurement, processing, 
and production decisions of a meat-processing company in a beef supply chain subject to  yield uncertainty, 
and the research show that higher variability of  product  increases the profits of the packer, but decreases the 
reliance on the contract market relative to the spot market. 
He, 2010 study the optimization problems of production and procurement in a decentralized supply chain 
consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, and the study shows that the supplier's profit function is 
piece-wise concave and explore structural properties for the manufacturer. He and Zhao, 2011 study the in-
ventory, production, and contracting decisions of a multi-echelon supply chain with both demand and supply 
uncertainty, and find that the commonly used wholesale price contracts used by both up-stream and down-
stream supply-chain members cannot coordinate the system, and further provide contract terms that lead to 
win–win situation. The study also investigate the impact of the supplier's risk attitude on the decisions, as well 
as the impact of spot market price for raw material on the performance of the entire supply chain. 
In this paper, we consider the coordination problem of agricultural products supply chain with stochastic 
output studies based on prices compensation strategy. Since the above study show the agricultural product 
supplier tend to reduce the production plan when it face the risk of yield uncertainty. We introduce the prices 
compensation strategy, which is that the retailer rise the procurement price higher than wholesale market price. 
We model the agricultural products supply chain with stochastic output, and prove prices compensation strat-
egy is Pareto improvement. 
2. Model Assumptions 
In this paper, the agricultural product supply chain consist of one supplier  and one retailer  with two type 
of market, which are the wholesale market and the consumer market. The retailer could purchase agricultural 
products in wholesale market or make procurement contract with supplier directly. If the supplier has no con-
tract with retailer, they would sale their agricultural products in wholesale market and the retailer buy the 
products in wholesale price. Since we focus on price compensation strategy, the contract of retailer and sup-
plier with price compensation would be simplify as the compensation on wholesale price per product. 
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Under the consideration that the agricultural products are perishable goods, we assume the consumer mar-
ket is market clear in order to ignore buy-back contract and simplify calculation. The notation of variables are 
defined as following: 
x  Supplier Agricultural products plan  
HP Wholesale prices; 
MP : Consumer market price ; 
Q : Price compensation; 
PR : Coefficient of stochastic yield, which is random variables of mean 1 and variance , and 1 ; 
The retail price and wholesale price of agricultural product are functions of the quantity of product, price 
function of demand in consumer markets is: ( )M M MP x a b x , where Ma is the passable highest con-
sumer price, Mb is the influence coefficient of quantity of supplier product; similarly, the price function of 
demand in wholesale markets is: ( )H H HP x a b x ,where Ha is the passable highest wholesale price, 
Hb is the influence coefficient of quantity of supplier product. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the  pro-
curement  price of retailer and the selling price of supplier are identical. 
Remark: 
M Ha a , the retail price is larger than the wholesale price,; 
1M Ha a , since the scale of measurement, difference of  retail price and wholesale price could always 
set larger than 1; 
( ) ( )M H Ha a a C , retail profit is greater than production profit; 
H Mb b , due to the supplier is far away from the consumer market, quantity of supplier product is less in-
fluence on the retail price is less than the coefficient on consumer  market price than wholesale price. 
3. The optimal strategies of retailer and supplier 
In this paper, we consider two kind structures of the supply chains: 1, suppliers sell product in the whole-
sale market, and retailer buy products from wholesale market and sell to consumer  in consumer  market price, 
there are no cooperation between supplier and retailer; 2, retailers and suppliers make a price compensation 
contract, the retailer compensate suppliers for every product; the supplier make producing plan according to 
price compensation, retailers would buy the product of supplier with price compensation, then sell to consum-
er in  the consumer price. 
3.1. Supply chain without cooperation  
The supplier's production plan is set according to the price function of demand in the wholesale market, 
and its expectation profit is; 
2 2
2
( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 1)
S p H H p H p H P
H H
F x E xR a b xR xC E a xR E b x R Cx
a C x b x  
The maximum expectation profit: 
2
( ( )) ( ( ( ) )
(( ) ( 1) )
S p H H p
H H
Max F x Max E xR a b xR xC
Max a C x b x  
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It is easy to see that ( )SF x   is convex function, because of  
2 ( ) 2 ( 1) 0S Hd F x b  
Hence there is optimal solution of ( )SF x , by the first order condition of optimization: 
2 ( 1)
S H
Max
H
a Cx
b  
So the maximum expectation profit of supplier is : 
 
2( )
4 ( 1)
S H
Max
H
a CF
b  
Similarly, the maximum expectation profit of retailer could be obtained as following: 
2
( ) ( ( )
( ) ( )( 1)
R p M M p H H p
M H H M
F x E xR a b xR a b xR
a a x b b x  
The maximum expectation profit of retailer: 
2
( ( ))
(( ) ( )( 1) )
R
M H H M
Max F x
Max a a x b b x  
It is easy to see that ( )RF x   is convex function, because of  
2 ( ) 2( )( 1) 0R H Md F x b b  
Hence there is optimal solution of ( )RF x , by the first order condition of optimization: 
2( )( 1)
R M H
Max
H M
a ax
b b  
The maximum expectation profit of retailer: 
2( )
4( )( 1)
R M H
Max
H M
a aF
b b  
Proposition 1: In the agricultural products supply chain without cooperation, the retailer's optimal order 
quantity is larger than the optimal production plan of supplier's. 
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Proof: by the assumptions of ( ) ( )M H Ha a a C and H Mb b , we get ( ) 0H H Mb b b . The 
numerator of optimal retailer order is larger than the supplier’s, and the denominator is smaller, it is not diffi-
cult to see that R SMax Maxx x , QED. 
Remark: Since the retailer's optimal order quantity is larger than the supplier’s, the retailer profit is not 
maximized, consumer market is in unsaturated state. The raise of the purchase price of retailer would motives 
the product plan of supplier, then improve supply chain profit. Since the supplier's production plan is made 
before the selling season in supply chain without influence of retailer, the expect profits of retailer is shown as 
following: 
 2( ) ( ) ( )( 1)( )
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
R S H H
Max M H H M
H H
a C a CF x a a b b
b b
 
3.2. Supply chain with cooperation  
In order to encourage supplier to expand production plan, the retailer compensate on wholesale price of 
supplier. Then, the supplier make production plan according to the wholesale market wholesale price and 
compensation price,  so the supplier's expected profit is present as following; 
2
( , ) ( ( ) )
( ) ( 1)
C
S p H H p
H H
F x Q E xR a b xR Q xC
a Q C x b x  
The maximum expectation profit of supplier: 
2
( ( )) ( ( ( ) )
(( ) ( 1) )
C
S p H H p p
H H
Max F x Max E xR a b xR Q xR C
Max a C Q x b x  
It is easy to see that ( )CSF x   is convex function, because of  
2 ( ) 2 ( 1) 0CS Hd F x b  
Hence there is optimal solution of ( )CSF x , by the first order condition of optimization: 
( )( )
2 ( 1)
CS H
Max
H
a C Qx Q
b  
So the maximum expectation profit of supplier is :  
2( )
4( )( 1)
CS H
Max
H M
a C QF
b b  
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From the above calculation, it is not difficult to see that the optimal production plan supplier is a function 
of price compensation, so retailer set price compensation to maximize their expected profit. The retailer ex-
pected profit is so a function of price compensation as shown following; 
2
( , ) ( ( ), )
( ) ( )( 1)( )
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
C C CS
R R Max
H H H
M H M H
H H H
F x Q F x Q Q
a C Q a C Q a C Qa a b b Q
b b b
 
The maximum expectation profit of retailer: 
2
( ( ))
(( ) ( )( 1)( )
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 2 ( 1)
C
R
H H H
M H M H
H H H
Max F Q
a C Q a C Q a C QMax a a b b Q
b b b
 
It is easy to see that ( )CRF x  is convex function, because of  the second order condition is: 
2 21( ) ( 2 ( 1) 2( )( 1))( ) 0
2 ( 1)
C
R H M H
H
d F Q b b b
b  
Hence there is optimal solution of ( )CRF x , by the first order condition of optimization: 
( ) ( 2 )( )R M H H M H H
Max
M H
a a b b b a CQ
b b  
The maximum expectation profit of retailer is shown as following: 
2( )
4( )( 1)
CR M H
Max
H M
a aF
b b  
Proposition 2: In the agricultural products supply chain with cooperation, retailer incentive the product plan 
of supplier by price compensation, the expected profit of supplier and retailer are increase,  thus the price 
compensation strategy is a Pareto improvement in supply chain. 
Proof: Supplier's expected revenue, through subsidies, molecular becomes larger, the denominator becomes 
small, apparently, The numerator of optimal expected profit of supplier in cooperation supply chain is larger 
than the one without cooperation, and the denominator is smaller, it is apparent that CS SMax MaxF F .  Similarly,  
the numerator of optimal expected profit of supplier in cooperation supply chain is larger than the one without 
cooperation, and the denominator is smaller, it is apparent that CR RMax MaxF F . So the price compensation 
strategy is a Pareto improvement in supply chain, QED. 
Remark: By applying the price compensation strategy, the retailer share profit of the consumer market, which 
is bigger than the wholesale market to supplier and incentives the products plan, then chang the production 
supply, and improve the expected profits both of supplier and retailer. 
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4. Numerical Experiment 
In this paper, numerical experiments apply the data based on banana market of Hainan province of China  
based. By the aid of Matlab7, optimal compensation price and optimal expected profit of retailer and supplier 
in both non-cooperation and cooperation supply chain are calculated, and the sensitive of coefficient of sto-
chastic yield  in supply chain is examined. The data used are shown as following: 
2000Ma : the possible highest price of banana consumer market, RMB per ton; 
0.01Mb : coefficient of banana yield influence on the consumer market; 
1100Ha : the possible highest price of banana  wholesale market,RMB per ton; 
0.015Hb : coefficient of banana  yield influence on the wholesale market; 
1.5 : variance of coefficient of stochastic yield; 
500C : production cost of  banana, RMB per ton;  
Table 1.  supply chains performance under difference variances of coefficient of stochastic yield 
variance of stochastic yield coefficient 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.5 
non-cooperation supplier produce plan (ton) 9090 8695 8333 7142 5143 
non-cooperation supplier expected profit (RMB) 2727300 2608700  2500000  2142900  1714300  
non-cooperation retailer expected profit (RMB) 8181800 7826100  7500000  6428600  5142900  
Price compensation (RMB per ton) 136.36  130.43  125.00  107.14 85.71 
cooperation supplier produce plan (ton) 24793 23629 22569 22569 22569 
cooperation supplier expected profit (RMB) 12323000 11599000 10951000 8929500 6717200 
cooperation retailer expected profit (RMB) 18409000 17609000 16875000 14464000 11571000 
From table 1, we can see: 
1, under any variances condition, cooperative supply chain perform better than non-cooperative supply 
chain, both retailer and supplier improve the expected profit; the price compensation strategy is Pareto im-
provement strategy; 
2, with the increase of variance of coefficient of stochastic yield, both non-cooperation and cooperation 
supply chain production plan decrease, so does the expected profit. It testifies the theory of Deo 2009, the 
producer tends to reduce the produce plan, under the high risk of stochastic yield; 
3, with the increase of variance of coefficient of stochastic yield, the price compensation of retailer is re-
duced, which explains economic principle of the risk reduce the price; 
4, in the non-cooperation supply chain, suppliers and expected profit of retailers is the 3-4 times larger than 
supplier; by the application of price compensation strategy, the profit allocation is significantly balance and  
expected profit difference between retailer and supplier reduce to about 2 times. 
5. Summary 
The coordination problems of agricultural product supply chain  with stochastic yield risk is studied. The 
agricultural producing is high risk by the suffering natural disaster, and the low profit reduce the produce plan. 
The market is shrink and the welfare of consumer is reduce. By introducing the price compensation strategy in 
supply chain, the supplier is encouraged to raise the production plan, and the expected profit of whole supply 
chain is raise. Mathematical models is established to prove the price compensation strategy of agricultural 
products supply chain is Pareto improvement, increased both the the supplier and the retailer's expected profit 
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and balance the profit allocation in supply chain. The study provides constructive suggestion to coordination 
in the supply chain of agricultural products. 
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